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ABSTRACT
Objective To determine whether statistical and machine-
learning methods, when applied to electronic health
record (EHR) access data, could help identify suspicious
(ie, potentially inappropriate) access to EHRs.
Methods From EHR access logs and other organizational
data collected over a 2-month period, the authors
extracted 26 features likely to be useful in detecting
suspicious accesses. Selected events were marked as
either suspicious or appropriate by privacy ofﬁcers, and
served as the gold standard set for model evaluation.
The authors trained logistic regression (LR) and support
vector machine (SVM) models on 10-fold cross-
validation sets of 1291 labeled events. The authors
evaluated the sensitivity of ﬁnal models on an external
set of 58 events that were identiﬁed as truly
inappropriate and investigated independently from this
study using standard operating procedures.
Results The area under the receiver operating
characteristic curve of the models on the whole data set
of 1291 events was 0.91 for LR, and 0.95 for SVM. The
sensitivity of the baseline model on this set was 0.8.
When the ﬁnal models were evaluated on the set of 58
investigated events, all of which were determined as
truly inappropriate, the sensitivity was 0 for the baseline
method, 0.76 for LR, and 0.79 for SVM.
Limitations The LR and SVM models may not generalize
because of interinstitutional differences in organizational
structures, applications, and workﬂows. Nevertheless,
our approach for constructing the models using
statistical and machine-learning techniques can be
generalized. An important limitation is the relatively small
sample used for the training set due to the effort
required for its construction.
Conclusion The results suggest that statistical and
machine-learning methods can play an important role in
helping privacy ofﬁcers detect suspicious accesses to
EHRs.
INTRODUCTION
With health records becoming computerized,
patients are becoming increasingly concerned about
the privacy and security of their health informa-
tion.
1 2 Health-information privacy and the loss of
such information are covered in the USA by federal
laws (Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act and Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act)
34and myriad
state regulations. Breaches of privacy require noti-
ﬁcation to the affected individuals, to government
agencies, and the media. The cost to the healthcare
organization of the loss of information during
security breaches is one of the highest of any
industry.
5 The notiﬁcations and adverse news
reports also lead to the loss of trust of patients.
67
Much work has been done by healthcare orga-
nizations to keep patient data in electronic health
records (EHRs) secure and private. Among common
security mechanisms are secure networks with
ﬁrewalls, encrypted devices and messages, strong
user passwords, auditing of access logs of clinical
systems, and device timeouts. Despite these secu-
rity measures, there remains a problem of how to
allow the ‘right’ users to access the ‘right’ patient
records, while preventing inappropriate accesses by
authorized users of the system. Organizational
polices allow access to records strictly for treat-
ment, payment, and healthcare operations (TPO)
reasons. Authorized users are typically granted
limited access to those functions in the EHR needed
to perform their jobs. This is in contrast to
restricting access to records by patients. Such
restrictions are more difﬁcult to regulate and
implement, since it is difﬁcult to predict accurately
the records for which a provider will need access.
Thus, one form of privacy breach occurs when staff
members of a healthcare organization access records
without TPO reasons. Among the reasons for inap-
propriate access is snooping of records of celebrities,
neighbors, coworkers, and family members.
6 7 At
other times, inappropriate access has been associated
with criminal activity.
8 In order to counter such
breaches, some institutions, such as the one
providing data for this study, have implemented
additional safeguards, including:
< annualprivacytrainingandannualconﬁdentiality
agreements for all employees;
< access rules, either prohibiting access or
requiring users to enter a reason for access,
when the patient being accessed is not registered
at the same site as the user;
< an annual assessment process where individual
managers review privileges for their own staff
members and can either approve continued
access or remove access that is no longer
required; and
< employeeself-audit,atoolthatallowsindividuals
to see who has looked at their record.
Investigations of breach complaints are done by
privacy ofﬁcers in the Health Information Systems
(HIS) or Medical Records departments. Users found
to have violated the policy are subject to disci-
plinary action, which may include termination.
RESTRICTING ACCESS TO RECORDS
Ferreira et al performed a comprehensive review on
access control models for EHRs over 10 years
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Research and applications(1996e2006) and found 59 studies.
9 Of these, only one of them
had been implemented in a real scenario; the others were
described in a theoretical framework or as prototypes. Later,
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), proposed by National
Institute of Standards and Technology
10 and the most
commonly used access control model among the above 59
studies, was further extended to a contextual-RBAC and Situa-
tion-Based Access Control (SBAC).
11 12 Unfortunately, the
feasibility of the proposed models was seldom tested on an
operational clinical system. Several factors make such access
control approaches challenging:
< unpredictable and dynamic care patterns including scheduled
and unscheduled inpatient, outpatient, and emergency
department visits;
< varied workﬂow: providers may ﬁll-in in unexpected areas;
< mobile workforce: access may be needed at unexpected
locations and times;
< collaborative nature of clinical work and teaching environ-
ments;
< large number of users and job titles/roles (the organization in
this study has approximately 40000 authorized users with
over 1700 unique job titles); and
< user job titles that do not always translate directly into a list
of patient(s) whose records would be appropriate to be
accessed at any point in time.
AUDITING ACCESS LOGS
The current practice of auditing access logs involves identifying
suspicious accesses to records based on known and simple
patterns, such as accesses to records of VIP or celebrity patients,
or accesses involving last-name matches between the patient
and the user suggesting access to a family member’s record. This
use of simple patterns could lead to a large number of false-
positive cases. Furthermore, these simple patterns cannot
produce ranked lists of cases, thus not providing a means for
prioritizing which cases should be investigated further. One of
our objectives was to create a system that could identify
suspicious accesses to EHRs based on certain patterns known to
us. However, the system should score each access for appropri-
ateness, so that the top scoring cases can be prioritized for
further investigation by privacy ofﬁcers. This would allow us to
accelerate the process of detecting suspicious accesses, that is,
accesses that are similar to patterns of breaches known to us.
The approach we have taken in this study is based on the
assumption that a vast majority of authorized users are
accessing records only of those patients for whom they have
a valid TPO reason. Further, many users have roles and
responsibilities that are consistent and repeatable, and their
accesses can be tracked over time to deﬁne patterns of access.
Thus, we used statistical and machine-learning techniques on
EHR access logs to detect rarely occurring suspicious accesses.
Other investigators have studied the use of audit logs and
other databases to identify appropriate and suspicious accesses
to EHRs. As described in the next few paragraphs, the breadth of
this research includes the development of algorithms, modeling
and deﬁnition of information sources used for determining
appropriateness of access, architectures for auditing systems,
and the application of business intelligence platforms.
Salazar-Kish et al deﬁned patterns and a heuristic algorithm for
determining the patienteuser match from data including the
patientePCPrelationship,patientappointmentinformation,and
user belonging to a clinic or department.
13 They studied the
impact of the algorithm to assess how often a warning might
need to be issued to a userattempting to access a record for which
apatienteuserrelationshipwasnotfoundbythealgorithm.Over
25% of accesses would result in a warning in their cases, which
would impose a tremendous burden on the users. Our work uses
similar types of patterns to deﬁne userepatient relationships for
creating a training set of data. However, we go further in that we
attempt to identify, using statistical and machine-learning
methods, patterns for suspicious access to records.
Asaro and colleagues created a taxonomy of ‘indicators’ for
EMR breaches.
14 The top-level categories of this taxonomy
included patient characteristics (eg, VIP patient, patient with
sensitive data such as HIV test results), patienteuser interac-
tions (eg, coworkers, spouse going through divorce), and session
characteristics (eg, access to a large number of records). They
describe positive and negative characteristics, where the latter
are similar to the patienteuser match described in the previous
study. The authors also created a taxonomy of information
requirements to perform an audit to discover breaches; some of
this information is available within the healthcare organization
such as appointment information, while some information such
as legal proceedings between spouses is not available. In an
article that extends this work, Herting deﬁnes internal and
external data sources classiﬁed by the repository type (eg, rela-
tional database, organizational directory, internet resource) that
can be used to augment information on individuals.
15 They
provide high-level guidelines on how one could score the reli-
ability of information from different sources and how to
combine information from different sources. The authors
describe the partial implementation of an auditing system based
on the above design ideas. They also highlight the potential for
disclosure of private information during auditing in trying to
access external information sources to learn about the
userepatient relationship. In this article, we describe how we
bring together data from many of these information sources to
build a system for detecting suspicious accesses.
Malin proposes a novel protocol, using cryptography, that
allows an EMR access auditor to obtain information from other
systems (eg, human-resource database) without revealing to the
custodians of those systems, the identity of those being inves-
tigated.
16 This can be useful when the third-party system was
not within the same security and privacy purview as the access
logs. In our study, we were able to integrate several of the
databases from our institution including the human-resources
database into a single audit database, thus precluding the need
to create the type of architecture described by Herting and
Asaro, and to use external information sources during the audit
process. Zhou, Liu, and colleagues designed a system architec-
ture and created a prototype implementation of an auditing
system that collects access logs from picture archiving and
communication systems (PACS) and other data with the
objective of identifying appropriateness of access.
17 One
component is an audit analysis tool to automatically analyze
logs and discover inappropriate accesses. This component, which
was not implemented by the authors, is the focus of our
research. We have implemented a system that largely automates
the data collection and, following a manual effort to train the
system, can automatically analyze logs.
Coleman implemented a commercially available business
intelligence system that combines access logs with other insti-
tutional data in a dimensional data warehouse to assist users in
auditing the logs.
18 The business intelligence tool allows users to
rapidly drill down the data to manually identify accesses that
seem inappropriate. The authors conclude that, even with such
a system, detecting inappropriate accesses is difﬁcult and time-
consuming. They identify a challenge in automating the analysis
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statistical and machine learning approaches we utilized in this
study created patterns of suspicious access that can be readily
implemented in these data warehouses. Furthermore, the data-
base we constructed for this project enables privacy ofﬁcers to
review suspected cases, by drilling down into accesses by the
user, and comparing patterns of access within a department or
across role-types.
None of the above studies investigated the use of statistical
and machine-learning techniques to support the detection of
suspicious access to EHRs in a real clinical system. These tech-
niques have been used to detect fraud in ﬁnancial reporting for
an audit client,
19 to detect fraud in credit card transaction
data,
20 to construct a spam email detector,
21 and to solve
a fraud-detection problem at a car-insurance company.
22 In this
article, we demonstrate a novel application of these techniques
in the analysis of EHR access logs.
METHODS
Overview
The data ﬂow in our study is summarized in ﬁgure 1. We
constructed an Event Data Mart (see Appendix 1 online at
www.jamia.org) of record access events (RAEs) from the insti-
tution’s operational databases (DBs) as a start-up set. The Event
Data Mart was populated with data from a 2-month period
from December 1, 2007 to January 31, 2008. Then, we built
a Feature DBda collection of useful features for detection of
suspicious access to the EHR, derived from the Event Data Mart.
Some events were selected as a training set and were sent to
privacy ofﬁcers at the participating institutions. Lastly, we built
a classiﬁer for identiﬁcation of suspicious access to EHRs.
Constructing the Feature DB
We deﬁned a set of features considered likely to help in the
detection of suspicious RAEs based on our review of previously
reported breach cases. The role-based and situation-based access
control models also were considered in the feature set deﬁnition.
These features were derived from the Event Data Mart and
inserted into the Feature DB (ﬁgure 1). For example, the feature
‘Is provider’ was coded as ‘1’ (for ‘yes’)o r‘0’ (for ‘no’) based on
the patient’s primary care physician information in the patient’s
registration record. Twenty-six features were constructed into
the Feature DB. These can be categorized into ﬁve classes: user-
related, patient-related, RAE-related, encounter-related, and
userepatient-relationship-related (box 1).
Preparing the training set
The next step was to create a data set to be used for training
statistical and machine-learning algorithms. We created the data
set iteratively in collaboration with privacy ofﬁcers from the HIS
departments of the study sites. These ofﬁcers labeled a subset of
Figure 1 Overview of the system to detect suspicious record access
events (RAE). DB, database.
Box 1 List of variables in a feature database derived from the Event Data Mart in ﬁgure 1
Record access event features
Time of access, Application*, Over 200 accesses in a dayy, Month of access, Day of month, Day of week, Hour of day, Access after clinic
hours, Access on clinic day
User features
Integrated delivery network employee, Hospital #1 employee, Hospital #2 employee, Nurse, Researcher, Is providerz
Patient features
VIPx, Is employee{, Had recent visit**
Encounter type features
Encounter location typeyy
Patienteuser relationship features
Same street address, Same city, Same zip code, Accessing own record, Care unit visit match, Clinic visit match, Work in same department,
Patient registered in user sitezz, Same family name.
The following explains variables whose meaning may not be clear from the label.
*Software program used to access the record.
yAccessed over 200 patient records in the same calendar day. (We selected a threshold of 200 accesses because in our experience most
providers would access well below this number of patients in a day for TPO reasons. A lower threshold might create many false positives,
and a higher threshold might lead to false negatives. A possible reason for such large number of accesses might be a researcher trying to
ﬁnd patients for a study. Without approval from an institutional review board, this type of access is inappropriate.)
zUser is listed as patient’s PCP in the patient registration system.
xPatient marked as VIP in the registration system.
{Patient is an employee of the integrated delivery network or one of its sites.
**Patient had visit in the past 60 days at any site in the integrated delivery network.
yyVisit to inpatient, outpatient, or emergency room locations.
zzPatient has an entry in the registration system at the site at which the user is an employee.
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‘negative’ respectively in the context of machine learningdafter
a thorough review of each event. They deﬁned a suspicious RAE
as one that appeared on initial review to be ‘inappropriate’ or
‘should prompt for a reason for access.’ An inappropriate access
is one where the user has no TPO reason for accessing the record.
The privacy ofﬁcers were making their judgment without
conducting a full investigation that would involve interviewing
the user, and which might reveal an RAE to be appropriate.
Therefore, such RAEs were marked as suspicious rather than
inappropriate. This approach was desirable, since our end
objective is to construct an autonomous system to identify
suspicious cases either for further investigation or potentially for
the EHR user interface to request a reason for access.
The study used RAEs only where the user accessing the record
was an employee of one of three sites: the integrated delivery
network (IDN) corporate entity itself, or two of the hospitals
belonging to the IDN. Medical residents and most of the
Information Systems staff are employees of the IDN corporate
entity. Clinicians and administrative support staff are employees
of the hospital. Each RAE added to the labeled data set was
reviewed by a privacy ofﬁcer from the respective site within the
IDN. The review team utilized the Event Data Mart and
external information sources, such as patient records and an
internal audit tool, to make their decisions. The audit tool
contained subset of the information in our Event Data Mart. It
included details of the user actions within the patient’s record
(eg, signing an order which would strongly indicate appropriate
access) that were not present within the Event Data Mart.
These details were not included in the Event Data Mart in this
phase of the study because of the very large volume of data. For
this study, the review team did not interview the user, or their
supervisors, which would be part of a complete investigation in
the case of a suspected breach. The review of each RAE in this
study took on the average approximately 10 min per reviewer.
In order to select a mix of RAEs that represented various
patterns of appropriate and suspicious events, the labeling was
performed through several iterations, as illustrated in ﬁgure 2. In
the ﬁrst round, we selected RAEs based on patterns of features
(scenarios, see Appendix 2 online at www.jamia.org) that were,
in our experience, illustrative of appropriate or suspicious/inap-
propriate accesses. Since such types of rule-based patterns were
used to detect suspicious accesses at the IDN, we deﬁned this
collection of seven patterns as the baseline method. We selected
a set of 505 RAEs from the Feature DB by stratiﬁed sampling,
where a stratum corresponded to one of the scenarios above. The
privacy ofﬁcers were not told which pattern was used to select
the case. Of the 505 RAEs selected for review, 216 were labeled
suspicious and 289 appropriate.
We built a logistic regression (LR) model from this labeled
training set of 505 RAEs. Then, we applied the ﬁtted model to
the 10.5 million RAEs in the Feature DB to assign LR prediction
probabilities to all. Next, we used the LR probabilities to select
unlabeled events. RAEs were randomly selected from the top,
middle, and bottom terciles. The selected RAEs were labeled by
the privacy ofﬁcers, who were blinded to the prediction proba-
bilities of the selected RAEs. In the next round, we built a new
LR model using labeled RAEs from the previous rounds. This
‘Build-Predict-Select-Label’ procedure was repeated three times.
Since suspicious RAEs are very rare compared to appropriate
RAEs, these data were subject to a class imbalance problem, that
is, in other words, the signiﬁcant difference in prior probabilities
of these classes of RAEs could cause degradation in the perfor-
mance of the classiﬁers we were creating. In order to overcome
this problem, we oversampled the suspicious RAEs to have the
balanced sets, similar to a sampling process commonly used in
active learning.
23 24 To further reduce the effect of the problem,
in each round described above and illustrated in ﬁgure 2,
prediction scores based on the previous round’s model were used
as prior probabilities to select new RAEs to be labeled.
25 Over-
sampling positive cases has the consequence that the model’s
estimates cannot be used as proxies for absolute risk. However,
proper ranking of the events was the focus of our interest, as this
determines which cases need follow-up by privacy ofﬁcers, and
this ranking did not change with oversampling. The prevalence
of suspicious access as well as the resources available to inves-
tigate them varies from institution to institution. Hence, the
important aspect of this type our model is the ability to
correctly rank the events, and not the ability to produce an
accurate estimate of absolute risk for each individual event.
At the end of this process, the ﬁnal training set contained 1291
labeled RAEs. Of these, 643 RAEs were marked as suspicious,
and 648 RAEs were marked as appropriate.
Building a classiﬁer
We built classiﬁers on the training set using logistic regression
(LR) and a support vector machine (SVM). Since our training set
was relatively small (0.09% of the total available set), we
adopted a 10-fold cross validation approach.
26 The whole
training set was ﬁrst partitioned into 10 near-equal parts. Then,
10 iterations of training and validation were performed, such
that, within each iteration a model was trained on nine parts,
and then the ﬁtted model was applied to the held-out part. The
area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) was
calculated on the held-out part. The AUC was used as
a discrimination measure for the binary classiﬁcation; a value for
AUC close to 1 indicates that the model discriminates well
between the positive and negative accesses, and a value close to
0.5 indicates poor discrimination.
27 Ten AUC values were
Figure 2 Construction of the training set. After the initialization set was
obtained, three cycles of ‘BUILDePREDICTeSELECTeLABEL’ were
conducted. RAE, record access events. DB, database.
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the data, the one with the median AUC on the held-out test set
was chosen as the ﬁnal model.
Evaluation on the study set
We measured the performance of the classiﬁers by applying the
ﬁnal models to the entire training set. We used the Wilcoxon
rank sum test to see whether there was any difference in
performance between the two techniques.
Evaluation on the investigated events set
We measured the performance of our models on an external set
of cases that were investigated for inappropriate access. Note
that the label in this data set is not suspicious, but rather truly
inappropriate. During the 2-month data-collection period for
this study, the privacy ofﬁcers of the three sites had investigated
several events. Of these 58 events (involving ﬁve users and 11
patient records) events were determined by them to be inap-
propriate accesses. The investigation of these events were trig-
gered and conducted independently from our study. Our ﬁnal
models were applied to this external set of 58 investigated
events. Since all events were true positives, we used sensitivity,
but not speciﬁcity, as the primary measure of performance.
RESULTS
In the 2-month study period, a total of 10.5 million RAEs
occurred. There were over 781000 unique patients whose
records were accessed. There were over 75000 users on the
network, and more than 40000 had access to at least one clinical
system.
Each of three sitesdthe IDN, Hospital 1 and Hospital 2dhad
one dedicated privacy ofﬁcer per site. The labeling result of one
site was reviewed by the privacy ofﬁcers of the other two sites.
Then, an average of two agreement rates of labeling were
obtained per site. For example, the average agreement rate of
IDN was 92%, calculated from 94% for ‘IDN versus Hospital 1’
and 90% for ‘IDN versus Hospital 2.’ The average agreement
rates for Hospital 1 and Hospital 2 were 90% and 83%
respectively.
Performance by cross-validation in the training set
We also applied the rule-based classiﬁcation technique,
consisting of the seven scenarios of suspicious access described in
Appendix 2 online (www.jamia.org), as a baseline method to the
1291 RAEs in the training set. Unlike LR or SVM, this rule-based
method produced only binary prediction labels, suspicious or
appropriate without prediction scores. The results are shown in
the confusion matrix (table 1). As can be seen, the baseline
method had a sensitivity of 80% for this data set.
Univariate analysis results of the labeled 1291 RAEs are
displayed in the online appendix, table A1 (www.jamia.org).
Figure 3 is a box plot of the AUC values from the 10-fold
cross-validation procedure used to construct the SVM and LR
models. Although the median AUC for the SVM (¼0.909) was
larger than that for the LR (¼0.885) model, the difference was
not signiﬁcant (p¼0.684, Wilcoxon rank sum test).
The ﬁnal model within each algorithm was chosen as the one
with the median AUC among the 10 models obtained from
cross-validation. This model was applied to the whole set of
1291 events.
28 The performances of the two classiﬁers are shown
in ﬁgure 4. The AUC for the SVM is 0.949, and that for the
LR model is 0.911. The 95% CI of the AUC was (0.894 to 0.927)
for the LR and (0.937 to 0.962) for the SVM model, which
suggests a signiﬁcant difference in the performance of the two
techniques.
29
The result of the ﬁnal LR model is shown in table 2. Predictors
are sorted by descending order of the OR estimates. All of the 18
predictors (including interactions) were deemed signiﬁcant.
Table 1 Confusion matrix depicting the performance of baseline
method in the training set
Gold standard*
Suspicious Appropriate
Prediction Suspicious 514 0 514
Appropriate 129 648 777
643 648 1291
*The gold standard was determined by security ofﬁcers.
Figure 3 Area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
(AUC) estimates from 10 held-out test sets using cross-validation drawn
as box plots. Each box extends from the 25% percentile to the 75%
percentile of AUCs. The 50% percentile (median) is shown with a bold
line. LR, logistic regression; SVM, support vector machine.
Figure 4 Sensitivity of the ﬁnal model applied to the training set
(n¼1291). The performance of the baseline technique is depicted as
a horizontal line. Since the baseline technique is a rule-based method, its
outputs are binary (suspicious/appropriate), and its sensitivity is a single
number unlike the statistical and machine-learning methods, for which
we can obtain different sensitivities depending on the threshold. LR,
logistic regression; SVM, support vector machine.
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patterns for suspicious access in the baseline method for 10.5
million RAEs.
Comparison of sensitivities in an external set of inappropriate
accesses
The baseline method, and the ﬁnal LR and SVM models were
applied to the set of 58 inappropriate events. The baseline
method failed to detect any of these events. Figure 5 is a plot of
sensitivity as a function of the cut-off for the predicted proba-
bility. The higher cut-off value will result in the smaller sensi-
tivity. With a cut-off value of 0.5, LR correctly detected 75.8%,
and SVM detected 79.3% of these events.
The following scenarios illustrate the investigated events that
the models failed to detect:
< The models failed to detect inappropriate access by an
employee into a coworker’s record because the coworker/
patient was not marked as an ‘employee’ in the operational
database.
< One event in which a mother accessed her child’s record was
missed, since the mother and her child had different last
names. The models infer family association based on the last
names.
< In one event, the user self-reported that she had accessed the
record by mistake.
DISCUSSION
This pilot study suggests that statistical and machine-learning
techniques can help automate the process of detecting suspi-
cious RAEs. The performance of the LR and SVM models, as
measured by the AUCs on the study set (>0.90) and sensitivity
on the investigated events set (>0.75), were very promising.
This study, unlike other approaches discussed earlier, addresses
the problem of detecting suspicious access to electronic medical
records using a scalable approach based on statistical and
machine-learning techniques. Inappropriate access to medical
records, while occurring rarely, is a serious data-security issue for
healthcare organizations. Due to the large number of record
access events and the challenges of limiting access of providers
to records in a healthcare setting, automated approaches to
identifying suspicious access can be a powerful tool for
improving data security. Highly suspicious cases can be inves-
tigated by privacy ofﬁcers to determine whether they were
appropriate or inappropriate accesses. While there is an initial
manual effort in constructing a training set and a predictive
model using our approach, subsequent use of this model to rank
suspicious accesses can be automated. During the data-collection
period of the study, the integration of data from Operational
DBs into the Event Data Mart was partly automated. We
subsequently have completely automated the integration of
data, thus allowing us to execute the SVM and LR models on the
data set automatically.
An advantage of using the statistical and machine-learning
models is that they produce scores indicating suspiciousness of
access. The scores can be used to prioritize the investigations of
events. In contrast, using simple rule-based patterns, such as in
the baseline method, results in a very large unranked list of
suspicious events (table 2) that have to be investigated by the
privacy ofﬁcers. Investigating tens of thousands of events every
months is far beyond the resource capabilities of any healthcare
organization.
In this study, we retrospectively analyzed data in an ofﬂine
setting to create models for detecting suspicious access. These
models can be implemented in an operational clinical setting by
integrating the data sources used to construct the model. These
Table 2 Logistic regression model
Feature Coefﬁcient OR (95% CI)
Works in same department 3.158 23.524 (2.450 to 225.843)
Same street address 2.599 13.450 (2.212 to 81.790)
Same family name 2.340 10.381 (6.653 to 16.199)
Over 200 accesses in day 1.300 3.669 (1.534 to 8.778)
VIP patient 1.175 3.238 (1.049 to 9.994)
Same city 1.047 2.849 (1.449 to 5.602)
Access on clinic day 0.869 2.385 (1.421 to 4.001)
Hospital 1 employee  0.434 0.648 (0.426 to 0.986)
Hospital 2 employee  0.448 0.639 (0.423 to 0.966)
Integrated delivery
network employee
 0.531 0.588 (0.363 to 0.952)
Had recent visit  0.616 0.540 (0.302 to 0.965)
Same zip code  1.465 0.231 (0.111 to 0.479)
Researcher  1.475 0.229 (0.114 to 0.458)
Had recent visit3VIP patient  1.610 0.200 (0.061 to 0.652)
Is provider  2.324 0.098 (0.050 to 0.190)
Care unit visit match  3.124 0.044 (0.022 to 0.088)
Had recent visit3works in
same department
 3.397 0.033 (0.003 to 0.347)
Works in same department3
same family name
 9.343 0.000 (0.000 to 0.002)
Figure 5 Sensitivity of the ﬁnal model applied to the external validation
set (n¼58). The performance of the baseline technique is drawn as
a reference. LR, logistic regression; SVM, support vector machine.
Table 3 Frequency of record access events (RAEs) from the 10.5
million RAEs matching each of the baseline patterns for suspicious
access
Baseline method pattern Frequency
Accessing a coworker’s record 975
Accessing a VIP patient’s record 1487
Accessing the record of a patient with no recent visit 1738
Accessing a family member’s record 9202
Researcher accessing over 200 records in a day 12439
Accessing a neighbor’s record 58152
Accessing the record of a patient who did not have a
medical record number at the user’s site*
1097496
*The large number of RAEs in this row is an artifact of the workﬂows and organizational
structures at this integrated delivery network. For example, over 400000 of these RAEs are
accesses by resident physicians who are employees of the integrated delivery network and
not of any clinical site.
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priate. Such knowledge could be used prospectively to prompt
for a reason for access to a medical record. It could also be used
to improve the yield of retrospective security audits by identi-
fying RAEs that need further investigation and hence utilizing
the limited time of the privacy ofﬁcers to address the cases
that most warrant an investigation. A more ambitious future
objective will be to detect highly suspicious access attempts in
real-time, and prevent such access.
This preliminary study has limitations. The prediction models
that we created may not generalize to other institutions because
of differences in organizational structures, workﬂows, and
software systems. Nevertheless, we expect that our approach of
constructing the models should be generalizable. By showing
that the process can be automated, we hope to encourage
other institutions to create models that facilitate the process of
identifying inappropriate accesses.
The procedure used to construct the training set relies on the
types of inappropriate RAEs known to the privacy ofﬁcers and
the research team that might bias the models. We used our
knowledge of inappropriate types of accesses in selecting initial
cases for the training set. The privacy ofﬁcers used their
knowledge to decide on appropriateness of accesses. Thus, the
model that is constructed might be biased toward detecting the
types of inappropriate accesses that are known to us. For
example, we assume that any staff member in a clinic in which
a patient has an appointment has a valid reason to access a
patient’s record. However, a particular staff member within
a clinic might not be involved in a patient’s care and might still
access the record inappropriately.
The baseline method, which had a sensitivity of 80% with the
training set, could not detect a single event in the external set of
58 inappropriate events. This difference in performance is of
concern. It calls into question the validity of the baseline
method, which could be overﬁtting the training data. The rules
in the baseline method were derived from experts who also
helped label the training set; hence this could be a possible
explanation. The performance difference could indicate a limi-
tation of systems that have to produce binary outputs instead of
continuous ones. The external set consisted only of truly inap-
propriate accesses, which are just a small subset of the suspi-
cious cases. Due to the binary nature of the baseline method, it
had to declare each case as appropriate or not, instead of
assigning a continuous estimate. What makes a suspicious case
also an inappropriate one appears not to be well captured in the
baseline method, and the small sample size calls for more
investigations. In contrast, LR and SVM produce continuous
estimates indicating degrees of appropriateness. Thus, their
performance on the external set, though degraded, retains a high
sensitivity.
We used supervised machine-learning methods to build
prediction models for rare events, which led to challenges. First,
the construction of the training set is an effort-intensive activity.
Each RAE had to be reviewed by an expert, a privacy ofﬁcer, to
label the cases for the training set. Thus, constructing a sufﬁ-
ciently large training set comes at a cost. Furthermore, due to
time-consuming manual review required by privacy ofﬁcers, it
was not possible to build a large training set. Since the inap-
propriate events are rare, we chose to represent them in
a disproportionately larger number in the training set, so that
a sufﬁciently diverse pattern of events were included in the
training set. One problem with this representation of events in
the training set is that the estimates produced by the models
cannot be considered true probabilities. However, the models
are still appropriate to rank cases in descending order of
suspiciousness to target the investigation by privacy ofﬁcers.
The set of features we used in this study was inﬂuenced by
the selection of operational data. We did not use clinical data
such as patient problems to determine appropriateness of access.
For example, in a patient with respiratory insufﬁciency, access
by a respiratory therapist might likely be appropriate. We used
some social associations between users and patients, such as
being department colleagues or neighbors at home. However,
there might be relationships that our database is not aware of,
such as high-school friendships that might lead to inappropriate
access. These kinds of data would be difﬁcult to impossible to
incorporate in the database.
A challenge in operationalizing the use of statistical and
machine-learning techniques for detecting suspicious access is to
be able to create larger training sets. This will require systematic
improvements to the ‘BUILDePREDICTeSELECTeLABEL’
procedure shown in ﬁgure 2. We are currently working on
optimized selection of events to be reviewed and automating
a review process for privacy ofﬁcers as well as collecting a larger
data set of labeled examples.
CONCLUSIONS
We developed an approach to utilizing statistical and machine-
learning methods to identify suspicious accesses to electronic
medical records. The approach automates the integration of data
from disparate sources in the enterprise into a single data mart.
The integrated data source is used to construct predictive models
for identifying suspicious access to electronic health records. The
results of our study indicate that these methods show promise.
However, methodological reﬁnements and further evaluation are
necessary, particularly in constructing training sets, to put these
methods into operational use in diverse clinical settings.
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